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ABSTRACT 
Extrusion of a polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) 
pilot seal located in the Space Shuttle Orbiter Primary 
Reaction Control Subsystem (PRCS) thruster fuel 
valve has been implicated in 68 ground and on-orbit 
fuel valve failures. A rash of six extrusion-related 
in-flight anomalies over a six-mission span from 
December 2001 to October 2002 led to heightened 
activity at various NASA centers, and the formation 
of a multidisciplinary team to solve the problem. 
Empirical and theoretical approaches were used. For 
example, thermomechanical analysis (TMA) and 
exposure tests showed that some extrusion is 
produced by thermal cycling; however, a review of 
thruster service histories did not reveal a strong link 
between thermal cycling and extrusion. Calculations 
showed that the amount of observed extrusion often 
exceeded the amount allowed by thermally-induced 
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stress relief. Failure analysis of failed hardware also 
revealed the presence of fuel-oxidizer reaction 
product (FORP) inside the fuel valve pilot seal cavity, 
and differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) showed 
that the FORP was intimately associated with the 
pilot seal material. Component-level exposure tests 
showed that FORP of similar composition could be 
produced by adjacent oxidizer valve leakage in the 
absence of thruster firing. Specific gravity data 
showed that extruded fuel valve pilot seals were less 
dense than new pilot seals or oxidizer valve pilot 
seals, indicating permanent modification of the PTFE 
occiired during service. It k concluded that some 
thermally-induced extrusion is unavoidable; however, 
oxidizer leakage-induced extrusion is mostly 
avoidable and can be mitigated. Several engineering 
level mitigation strategies are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
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Pilot operated valves (POVs) are used to control 
the flow of hypergolic liquid propellants mono- 
methylhydrazine (fuel) and nitrogen tetroxide 
(oxidizer) to the Shuttle orbiter Primary Reaction 
Control Subsystem (PRCS) thrusters. The POV 
incorporates a two-stage design: a solenoid-actuated 
pilot stage, whlch in turn controls a pressure-actuated 
main stage. Isolation of propellant supply from the 
thruster chamber is accomplished in part by a captive 
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Figure 1 Pilot operated valve cross section showing the location of the polytetrafluoroethylene pilot seal. 
polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) Teflon 7A@* pilot 
seal retained inside a Custom 455@+ (C455) stadess 
steel cavity (Figure 1).$ 
propellant around the pilot poppet, thus impedmg or 
preventing the main valve stage from opening. It can 
also prevent the main stage from staying open with 
adequate force margin, particularly if there is gas in 
the main stage actuation cavity. During thruster 
operation on-orbit, pilot seal extrusion may be 
indicated by low or erratic chamber pressure (low Pc) 
or failure of the thruster to fire upon command 
(Fail-Off). During ground servicing, pilot seal 
extrusion may be indicated by slow gaseous nitrogen 
(GN3 main valve opening tirnes (2 38 ms), slow 
water main valve opening response times f> 33 ms), 
shallow pressure drop or liquid flow perturbation 
across the main stage, or an abnormally shaped 
(off-nominal) valve opening response current trace. 
Poppet lift tests and x-ray radiography have also been 
used to determine the presence of pilot seal extrusion 
during ground servicing. While the above tests are 
nondestructive; the most reliable means to 
characterize and quantify extrusion is post-mortem 
metrology performed on removed pilot seat 
assemblies (Marquardt P/N 23568 1). 
Extrusion of the pilot seal restricts the flow of 
Other known discriminators for fuel valve pilot 
The vast majority of extrusion cases have 
involved fuel valve pilot seals. Oxidizer valve 
pilot seals, by contrast, usually fail due to 
spontaneous oxidizer absorption, seal softening 
and deformation, and ultimately leakage. 
A review of selected original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) Failure Malfunction 
Reports (FMRs) issued during ca. 1987-88 
during the thermal insulation protective system 
modification (TIPS MOD), which involved 
ground acceptance testing if all fleet thrusters, 
yielded little evidence of slow GN2 response 
(GN2 data not always available).§ 
All failures occurred after mission and ground 
turnaround exposure. 
There are no known failures of newly rebuilt 
hardware that saw routine processing. 
The reason oxidizer valve pilot seals (average 
proud heightT = 4 1 h 23 pm (1.6 f 0.9 mil), n= 2 1) do 
not extrude as much as fuel valve pilot seals (average 
proud height = 144 * 79 pm (5.7 f 3.1 mil), n= 36) is 
threefold. First, oxidizer valves are newer than fuel 
valves on average due to a hgher failure rate (220 
oxidizer valves with documented mission firing 
seal extrusion are: 
* Teflona is a registered trademark of E. I. DuPont and Nemours 
and Company, Wilmington, DE. 
Custom 455@ is a registered trademark of Carpenter 
Technology Corporation, Reading, Pennsylvania. ' Propellant isolation is also accomplished by the main 
poppetkeat. 
2 
' Ross, B., Private communication. Boeing Human Space Flight 
and Exploration, White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, 
New Mexico. May 2002. 
The proud height is the height of the inner diameter edge of 
PTFE pilot seat above the downstream metal seat. 
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history replaced since 198 1 , versus 1 10 fuel valves). 
Second, evaporative cooling of oxidizer (boiling 
point = 2 1 "C (70 OF))  compared to the fuel (boiling 
point = 88 "C (1 90 OF)) reduces the amount of heat 
soakback after thruster firing that reaches the oxidizer 
valve pilot seal. Third, the pilot seal material of 
construction, Teflon 7A PTFE, spontaneously 
absorbs oxidizer (up to 3.8 percent (wlw) oxidizer 
after 7 weeks'), leading to reversible property 
changes such as softening' and reduction of 
~rystallinity.~ This results in increased deformation 
of the pilot seal under poppet loading, and in @e 
worst case scenario, metal-to-metal contact and 
oxidizer leakage. 
has become an important issue in the effort to 
improve PRCS reliability and reduce associated life 
cycle costs. Also, given the unacceptable 
consequences of multiple thruster failures occurring 
on the same attitude control axis (mission termination 
or loss of vehicle control), it became imperative to 
determine the cause(s) of extrusion. Only then could 
appropriate engineering controls be formulated and 
implemented to mitigate further occurrence. 
Minimizing PRCS fuel valve pilot seal extrusion 
extrusion is referred to as oxidizer-induced extrusion, 
and has been traced to the installation of a universal 
throat plug accessory (UTPA) in 199 1. The purpose 
of the UPTA was twofold: 1) to prevent moisture 
intrusion and alleviate associated nitric acid-corrosion 
problems, and 2) to prevent exposure of ground 
personnel to propellants. However, as an unintended 
consequence, the UTPA was later found to increase 
oxidizer vapor concentrations near the fuel valve. 
A rash of oxidizer valve leakage during the early 
199Os, coupled with clogging of the UTPA orifice 
during 1995-96 (exacerbating oxidizer build-up), and 
subsequent implementation of a necessarily 
discontinuous gaseous nitrogen (GNz) trickle purge 
beginning in 1998, did not eliminate high oxidizer 
vapor concentrations! The potentially adverse 
consequences of having high oxidizer vapor 
concentrations and 1.82 MPa (264 psia) pressurized 
fuel on opposite sides of a 3 3 0 - p  (1 3 mil) wide pilot 
seal-poppet sealing interface are fairly apparent. 
However, finding conclusive documentation, or firm 
theoretical or empirical grounds to link extrusion with 
oxidizer valve leakage turned out to be nontrivial. 
Failure History and Distribution 
Extrusion Mechanisms 
Soon after the first documented extrusion-related 
failure in 1994, two mechanisms were proposed to 
explain fuel valve pilot seal extrusion! The first 
mechanism involves thermal expansion mismatch of 
adjacent plastic (PTFE) and metal ((355) materials 
of construction, leading to gradual extrusion of the 
pilot seal. For example, the coefficient of thermal 
expansion of PTFE (1.24 x lo4 OC-' for T = 25 to 
100 "C (77 to 212 OF)' is more than one order of 
magnitude greater than that of C455 (1.06 x lo5  OC-' 
for T = 21 to 93 "C (72 to 200 Thls type of 
extrusion is referred to as thermal extrusion, and was 
thought to be caused by excessive or prolonged 
thermal cycles on-orbit (during thruster firing or solar 
heating), during ground processing (during vacuum 
bake-outs to remove water or epoxy coating curing 
repairs), or during part fabrication (during part 
welding operations). 
The second mechanism involves oxidizer leakage 
from the adjacent oxidize; valve on the same thruster 
during ground turnaround operations at Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC), leading to reaction with MMH, 
and c u h a t i n g  in the production of fuel-oxidizer 
reaction product (FORP) and liberation of large 
quantities of heat and gas in or near the fuel valve 
pilot seal or pilot seal cavity, leading in turn to more 
rapid extrusion of the pilot seal. This type of 
Extrusion was first documented after thruster 
Serial Number (SM) 325 Failed-Off during Space 
Transportation System Flight (STS)-68 in December 
1994.4.' Through 2002 and including the STS-68 
SM 325 failure, there have been a total of ten 
In-Flight Anomalies (IFAs) attributed directly to 
extrusion of the pilot seal (Table 1, top): 
8 Fail-Off IFAs: S/Ns 325 (STS-68), 101 (STS- 
(STS-108), 215 (STS-1 lo), and 229 (STS-112) 
2 !ow Pc F 4 s :  S,% 4 1 1 and 484 (both during 
A rash of six extrusion-related IFAs over a 
six-mission span from Dec. 2001 to Oct. 2002 (on 
STSs-108, -1 10, and -112) led to heightened activity 
at various NASA centers, and the formation of a 
multidisciplinary team to solve this problem. IFAs 
(6) for which extrusion was not implicated,** but was 
detected during follow-up ground testing are as 
follows (Table 1, top): 
81), 451 (STS-83), 628 (STS-gl), 101 and 330 
STS-110) 
1 Heater Fail-Off IFA: S/N 616 (STS-77) 
# 
Fuel valve SM 764 (thruster SM 41 I ) ,  for example, which 
failed after only 5 missions, had a history of adjacent oxidizer 
valve leakage, and was plagued by problems with an effectively 
administered GN2 trickle purge. 
Fitzgerald, E. , Private communication, OMS-RCS NASA 
Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX. October 2003. 
** 
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.' 
2 Fail-Leak IFAs: S/Ns 476 (STS-67) and 2 19 
3 Fail-Off IFAs: SMs 574 (STS-72), 234 (STS- 
76), and 498 (STS-95) 
In addition to the above 16 IFAs, another 52 fuel 
valves (Table 1, bottom; Table 2) with extruded pilot 
seals were detected between 1994 and 2003 during 
routine and noruoutine thruster repair and 
replacement (R&R) at the NASA Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) 
Depot, giving a total of 68 extrusion cases. The 
overall flight plus ground extrusion failure rate has 
remained fairly constant since 1994,tt with the 
number of failures typically peaking in years when 
entire ship sets are returned for water flushing to 
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Figure 2 Distribution of PRCS fuel valve pilot seal 
extrusion cases from 1994 to 2003. 
Before STS-68, another 39 fuel valves with 
mission history were replaced by the OEM 
(Marquardt, Van Nuys, California; now Aerojet, 
Redmond, Washington). Gypsum intrusion after the 
1982 STS-3 landing, the Shuttle Orbiter Forward 
Reaction Control Pod Number 2 (FRC2) Power-On 
anomaly during the 1986 STS-61C flow, and ground 
screening tests during the 1986-1988 TIPS-MOD 
overhaul lead to most of the pre-STS-68 fuel valve 
repairs. Although extrusion is suspected or has been 
verified in 96-percent (68 of 71) of the fuel valve 
failures since STS-68; visual examination of selected 
pilot seals taken from valves that failed before 
STS-68 did not show severe extrusion.SS A review of 
tt On average, about one extrusion case is observed for every 
three thrusters removed from the fleet and processed. A plot of 
thrusters processed versus number of thrusters failed due to 
extrusion gave a linear correlation coefficient, Rz, of 0.77. '' Wichmann, H. Private communication. Consultant, J A M  
Technologies, White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, 
New Mexico. December 2001. 
Marquardt FMRs issued during the 1986-88 TIPS 
MOD also gave no conclusive evidence of extrusion. 
Consequently, it may be inferred that extrusion is a 
more recent phenomenon. 
Extrusion Tvues 
Two types of fuel valve pilot seal extrusion have 
been observed: extrusion of the entire seal across the 
sealing (inner diameter, id) and nonsealing (outer 
diameter, od) surfaces of the pilot seal (Type I 
extrusion); and preferential extrusion of the 
non-sealing (od) surface of the pilot seal (Type N 
extrusion) (Figure 3).§§ 
Figure 3 Impression replicas of fuel valve pilot seals 
showing Type I (top) and II (bottom) extrusion. 
EXPERIMENTAL 
Service Historv Correlations 
Firing history data through STS-113 (flown 
November 2002) were obtained from JSC OMS/RCS 
Operations. Available firing history data were 
combined with fuel valve R&R histones obtained 
from WSTF Depot (PRCS Major Configuration 
TabZe)fl and KSC Reusable Space Systems. This 
'' An arbitrary proud height of 64 pm (2.5 mil) was the 
established break point between Type I and Trpe 11 extrusion. 
In-house document. PRCS Major Configuration Table. 
WSTF intranet at S4\:wstfgrp\prop\depot\p-~onfig\ps- 
config.mdb, NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test 
Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico, most recent update. 
4 




allowed the years in service,# number of burns, 
cumulative ontime, average time per burn, adjacent 
oxidizer valve R&R history to be determined for any 
given he1 valve. Vacuum bakeout and cover cap 
epoxy cure histories were obtained from the WSTF 
Chamber Lab and WSTF Depot, respectively. 
Gaseous helium (GHe) leakage data (only high 
pressure forward leak rates at ambient temperature 
are considered in this paper) were taken from 
WSTF-issued TT&E (Test Teardown and 
Evaluation) reports. The dependence of extrusion on 
thruster duty cycle (fuing priority, duration, and 
sequence during mission) was not investigated. The 
effect of heat soakback during post-ATP hot fire tests 
was also not investigated; however, temperatures 
rarely exceed 60 "C (140 OF), if ever, even after 
steady state bums on-ground.*** The possible effect 
of solar (attitude) heating is discussed elsewhere.' 
Analvtical Methods 
A Haake-Fisons (formerly Seiko) Model 120C 
Thermomechanical Analyzer equipped with a liquid 
nitrogen cooling accessory was used to measure the 
instantaneous and permanent extrusion of a pilot seal 
from a pilot seat assembly. To accommodate 
as-received pilot seat assemblies (TMA quartz sample 
holder diameter = 0.39 in. (10 mm)), excess metal 
from the pilot seat assembly was removed by 
machining with isopropyl alcohol, thus avoiding 
frictional heating. The effect of thermal cycling was 
evaluated by heating the machined parts to 
temperatures ranging from 52 "C (125 OF) to 93 "C 
(200 OF). 
A Nicolet Magna 750 single beam instrument 
with a Spectra-Tech Model 0047-009 microscope 
attachment equipped with a Mercury Cadmium 
I eiiuride (MCTB) detector was used for quaiitative 
infrared identification. FORP analyses were 
performed either by direct transfer of a small amount 
of residue to a zinc selenide window, which was then 
analyzed in transmission mode, or directly transferred 
to a diamond cell, which was then compressed and 
analyzed with the FTIR microscope. In general, 
64 scans were collected at a resolution of 2 cm-'. 
Diamond cell window spacings were used at a 
compression level that m i h i z e d  interference 
patterns in the spectrum. Spectral matches were 
m ,, 
#I 
The number of years in service for each valve was based on 
thruster installation and removal dates, instead of thruster 
shipping dates from the manufacturer or repair facility, or pod- 
on and pod-off dates at KSC. 
Meersheidt, M., Private communication. White Sands Test 
Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico. May 2003. 
*** 
obtained by comparing spectra with those in a WSTF 
materials library and the Aldrich Condensed Phase 
library. 
The presence of energetic propellant species, i.e., 
FORP, in PTFE pilot seals was evaluated using a TA 
Instruments Model 2920 Differential Scanning 
Calorimetry @SC) in accordance with procedures 
given in ASTM Standard Test Method for Transition 
Temperatures of Polymers by Thermal Analysis 
(D 3418) (both first and second heating curves were 
used). Care was taken to sample material at the 
sealing interface (leg) in addition to material from the 
recessed cavity (foot). All samples (1 0 mg) were 
equilibrated at 40 "C, then heated at 10 "C min-' from 
40 to 380 "C with an isothermal dwell of 10 min at 
380 "C, cooled to 40 "C at 10 "C min-', equilibrated 
at 40 "C, then followed by the second heating. All 
determinations were conducted under nitrogen. 
residues on the exposed PTFE and C455 surfaces, 
were sampled and analyzed for ammonium m:], 
methylammonium [CH3NH;], and 
dimethylammonium [(CH3)2NH,+]) using a Dionex 
DX-600 Ion Chromatograph (IC) system equipped 
with a cation exchange column in conjunction with 
conductimetric detection. Residues were also 
analyzed for hydrazinium m2NH:], 
monomethylhydrazinium [CH3NH2'NH2] and 
uns ymme trical-dime thylhydrazinium 
[(CH3)2NH"NH2] using a Hewlett-Packard Model 
1100 High Performance Liquid Chromatograph 
(HPLC) equipped with an ion exchange column in 
conjunction with amperometric detection. Nitrate 
(NOi) analyses were performed using a Dionex 
DX-600 Ion Chromatograph (IC) system equipped 
with an anion exchange column in conjunction with 
conductimetric detection. When sufficient residue 
was avaiiabie, every anempr was made to determine 
the amount and stoichiometry of FORP species 
present. 
was determined in accordance with ASTM Test 
Method for Specific Gravity of Plastics by 
Displacement (D 792) and weight percent 
crystallinity, W ', determined by measuring the 
density of as-received rod stock (p) and using 
literature values for densities of the pure amorphous 
(pa) and pure crystalline (pc) phases' according to the 
relationship: 
Following removal of the retainer, visible FORP 
Specific gravity (density) of PTFE pilot seals 
(2) W'=' [ - p - p a  ).loo% 
P P, -P, 
The apparatus used was a Mettler AT201 analytical 
balance and Mettler Toledo Density Determination 
Kit for AT balances. Samples were allowed to sit in 
7 
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the lab for 24 hours prior to testing at 23 rt 2 "C at 
ambient humidity. The submersion medium used was 
boiled, deionized 18 MR cm water. After boiling, 
1-2 drops of ZonyPttt fluorosurfactant wetting agent 
was added per 100 mL water. A magnifymg glass 
was used to further insure no air bubbles clung to 
submerged parts during weighings. 
The magnitude and type of extrusion was 
determined by making impression replicas of the 
sealing interface of Marquardt P/N 235681. Replicas 
were made from Reprorubber Thin Pour #16135 
(FlexBar Machme Corp., Islandia, NY). After 
curing, the replicas were sectioned, and seal heights 
were measured in at two locations 180" apart using a 
Leco 300 Metallograph equipped with a Mitutoyo 
Model ID-C125EB precision x-y recorder with 
1-0.00005 in. (25.4-0.0001 mm) resolution. All pilot 
seal height measurements were made at 32 to 63x 
magnification under polarized light. 
Calculations 
The extrusion volume was approximated as n {id 
height.[rppp2 - r;:] + od heightfrd 2 - rmppe:]} 
where id and od heights were determined by 
impression replica metrology; and rd, rid, and rpoppef 
were midrange tolerances taken from engineering 
drawings. The maximum extrusion due to complete 
stress relief of a pilot seal after interference fitting 
was calculated using mid-range design tolerances for 
mating PTFE and metal parts. For example, the 
pre-installation volume of the PTFE pilot seal 
preform was calculated as: 
where rid was the inner diameter of the exposed 
rez!inn b surface, r,. was the outer dizmeter of the 
entrapped nonsealing surface, and hsal and hnonsal 
were radially dependent functions describing the 
8O-angled sealing surface, and outer diameter of the 
entrapped nonsealing interface, respectively. Both 
hseol and hnonseul were modified to account for comer 
radii and edge breaks. A similar expression was 
derived for the metal cavity volume, Vcuviry,, allowing 
calculation of the interference fit (or overfill = AV 
(=Vseor Vcuv;,). This allowed the maximum allowable 
id and od extrusion, AIid and A l d ,  due to stress relief 
to be calculated as: 
ttt Zonyl@ is a registered trademark of E. I. DuPont and 
Nemours and Company., Wilmington, DE. 
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where A&+ AVd = AV. All dimensions 
corresponded to midrange (nominal) tolerances taken 
from respective Marquardt engineering drawings for 
the seat (drawing 235677 Rev. E), preform (drawing 
234161, Rev. F), and retainer (drawings 234160 
Rev. D for circumferentially-welded (C-welded) 
retainers, and 235679 Rev. B for intermittently- 
welded (I-welded) retainers). 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Thermal Cvcling of Flight-like Pilot Seat Assemblies 
Pilot seals undergo extensive thermal cycling 
throughout their service lifetime. For example, 
during routine thruster flushing with water and 
nonroutine valve removal and replacement (R&R), 
thrusters or valves removed from thrusters are 
subjected to 1.5 to 8-hr vacuum bakeouts at 54 to 
77 "C (130 to 170 OF).$$* Also, the cover cap on the 
valve body must be periodically recoated with epoxy 
which requires curing at 90 k 5 "C (194 f 9 O F )  for 
1 hr, entailing heating of the valve body, and, 
consequently, the pilot seal. During mission, 
operational temperatures as high as 69 "C (157 OF) 
are allowed by flight rules; however, non-operational 
temperatures as high as 100 "C (212 OF) may be 
encountered during descent (especially for the 
forward downward firing thrusters). 
To evaluate the effect of thermal cycling on 
extrusion, new pilot seat assemblies were cycled in a 
TMA furnace to 60 "C (140 OF). After three cycles 
-4 microns (0.2 mil) of pilot seal od extrusion was 
produced (Figure 4). The amount of recovery (return 
to the original dimension) was nearly quantitative 
after the second and subsequent heatings. Subsequent 
heatings to higher temperatures produced more 
extrusion, again with time-dependent recovery noted 
between heatings (data not shown). Similarly, 
thermal cycling of an unextruded oxidizer valve pilot 
seal to 80 "C (1 75 O F )  produced -7 microns (0.3 mil) 
of od extrusion (data not shown), again with nearly 
quantitative recovery after the second and subsequent 
heatings. 
fuel valve pilot seals taken from the field was 
The average od extrusion observed for extruded 
"' In-house documents. PRCS Thruster Flush Procedure., WJI- 
PROP-CTF-OOIO.D, Issued Sept. 17,1999; and WSTFPRCS 
Thruster Valve Overhaul and Repair - Valve Acceptance Test 
Procedure., WJI-PROP-CTF-0018.D, Issued Sept. 26, 1999, 
NASA Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility, Las 
Cruces, New Mexico. 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Figure 4 Thermomechanical analysis data showing 
incremental extrusion of a pilot seal after three 
consecutive 8-hr. excursions to 60 "C (140 OF) under 
conditions of negligible sealing load. 
21 1 f 102 p (8.3 ? 4.0 mil, n=35).@§ Therefore, 
the TMA data suggest that factors other than thermal 
cycling contribute to extrusion. However, it must be 
noted that the load on the pilot seal during TMA 
(0.098 N (0.022 lbf)) was negligible compared to the 
load in service due to poppet spring-loading and 
liquid propellant system pressure (25 N (5.6 lbf)). In 
fact, the load in service is large enough to cause 
cu. 20 percent lateral cold flowm of the PTFE, 
leading to 'mushrooming' of the PTFE outside of the 
metal cavity. It is proposed herein that the resulting 
excess plug of PTFE outside of the pilot seal cavity 
effectively hinders recovery of the pilot seal after 
heating, leading to more extrusion than shown in 
Figure 4. 
More realistic data evaluating the effect of 
thermal cycling under conditions duplicating poppet 
spring-loading and liquid propellant system pressure 
were obtained during component-level exposure tests 
conducted at WSTF." Six consecutive ground 
turnaround-mission profiles were simulated, including 
worst case saturated oxidizer vapor exposures 
on-ground, and mission descent heatings to 100 "C 
(212 OF). Post-test metrology revealed 58 f 13 pm 
(2.3 f 0.5 mil, n=2) of od extrusion, short of the 
2 1 1 pm value observed in the field. However, if the 
exposure test had been continued for 16.8 missions 
(the average number of missions for the 68 extrusion 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
"' Note: od extrusion = final od height - initial od height (initial 
od heights were generally not known, but based on mid-range 
engineering tolerances, would have a value of 99 and 124 pm 
(3.9 and 4.9 mil) for circumferentially and intermittently- 
welded pilot seats assemblies, respectively. 
The amount of lateral cold flow, given by rod- rid , of 
representative, actuated, extruded pilot seals was found to be 
781 f 22 pm (30.7 
(25.3 mil) midrange tolerance for a starting pilot seal perform. 
0.9 mil, n = 5), compared to 641 pm 
cases cited in this paper), linear extrapolation would 
predict 161 f 36 pm (6.3 f 1.4 mil) of od extrusion, 
which approaches the 2 1 1 pm value observed in the 
field. 
What balance of extrusion remains could be due 
to thermal cycling fiom other heat sources not 
simulated in the exposure tests (such as solar heating, 
vacuum bake-outs, epoxy cures, and ground firings). 
The possible effect of increased lateral cold-flow in 
the field due to valve actuation (actuation 3 
increased cold flow less recovery 3 more 
extrusion) was also considered. Bactuated 
propellant-exposed (fuel + oxidizer) pilot seals used 
in the component-level exposure test, exhibited 13 
percent lateral cold-flow (rod- rid = 691 k 17 p 
(27.3 f 0.7 mil), n=2), which approaches the 
20 percent value observed for extruded pilot seals 
taken ti-om the field.Pw By comparison, mactuated 
fuel-exposed pilot seals exhibited negligible lateral 
n=2). This suggests that static poppet load (without 
actuation) in the presence of oxidizer vapor is 
sufficient to cause significant lateral cold flow. It is 
therefore plausible that oxidizer vapor can contribute 
to extrusion in two distinct ways: 1) reversible uptake 
of oxidizer and subsequent disruption of 
intramolecular attractive forces, causing in turn 
softening and increased lateral cold flow, thereby 
preventing seal recovery, and 2) irreversible 
de-densification and increased compressibility caused 
by reaction of oxidizer with fuel inside the bulk PTFE 
(vide infra). 
cold-flow (rod- rid = 643 k 3 (25.3f 0.1 mil), 
Service Historv Correlation 
Correlation with Mission Firing Histories 
A review of service history records revealed an 
apparent llnk between extrusion type and years in 
service. For example, verified Type I1 cases have, on 
average, logged more years in service (13.5 ? 3.9 
years, n = 7), than verified Type I extrusion cases 
(9.8 * 5.2 years, n = 31) (Figure 5)."# Similarly, 
Type I extrusion cases had, on average, fewer burns 
and lower mission ontime than Type I1 cases. This 
suggests that cumulative load at temperature and the 
number of valve actuations during firing are 
important determining factors of extrusion type. 
Interestingly, all ten extrusion-related IFAs exhibit 
Type I extrusion, a majority of those (8 of 10 cases) 
failed with unusually low bums, ontime, and years in 
##I 
Only cases in which extrusion type was verified by impression 
replicas were considered. 
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Figure 5 Distribution of extrusion type with selected 
service history parameters for thrusters of verified 
extrusion type (based on metrology data). 
service. These may be considered to have failed 
prematurely (see Figure 5 ,  thrusters 101 #1, 101 #2, 
229,330,411,451,484, and 628). 
Slightly more than the expected number of aft 
reaction control subsystem (ARCS) versus forward 
reaction control subsystem (FRCS) extrusion cases 
was observed (49 of 68 cases or 72 percent of 
extrusion cases came from ARCS thrusters, versus 28 
of 38 thrusters or 63 percent expected). It is unclear 
if the higher than expected ARSC:FRSC failure ratio 
is related to duty cycle (e.g., aft steady state burns for 
delta V maneuvers) or statistica1,scatter. No 
correlation (R2 = 0.09) was found between the 
amount of extrusion and the number of missions, 
which varied fiom 5 to 27 missions for the 68 
extrusion cases cited in this paper. 
(approximate UTPA installation date, STS-37 on) 
showed that extrusion has occurred in all 24 aft firing 
locations, and in 9 of the 14 forward firing positions 
(extrusion absent in F l u ,  F2U, FlL, F2R, and F2D). 
There was also a sZightZy greater incidence of 
extrusion in downward firing ARCS thrusters, and in 
forward firing FRCS thrusters; however, it is 
presently unknown if these apparent trends stem fiom 
position-specific GN2 trickle purge effectiveness, 
mission duty cycle, or statistical scatter. 
various mission service history parameters (number 
Inspection of mission usage patterns since 199 1 
Correlation between the amount of extrusion and 
of years in service, burns, ontime, and time per bums 
since installation) were generally poor; however, a 
plot of the amount of extrusion against years in 
service gave a R2 of 0.54 for Type I1 extrusion cases 
(plot not shown). (By comparison a plot of the 
amount of extrusion against years in service gave a R2 
of 0.09 for Type I extrusion cases.) This suggests 
that years in service may have some mfluence on 
Type I1 extrusion. Similarly, correlations between 
specific service history parameters were poor; 
however, a plot of the time per burn against the 
number of bums on-orbit gave a R2 of 0.36 for 
Type 11 extrusion cases (plot not shown). This 
suggests that longer burns may contribute to the 
reduction of valve life as measured by the number of 
bums, and again augments the notion that only 
Type I1 extrusion cases show any dependence on 
service history. Last, the service histories of active 
fuel valves (without extrusion) were found to overlap 
those of failed fuel valves (with extrusion). 
Correlation with Vacuum Bakeout and EDOXV 
Cure Histories 
To determine if thermal cycling from 
non-mission related (ground) heat sources 
contributing to extrusion, WSTF vacuum bakeout 
records for the period January 1995 to May 1997 
were examined, along with epoxy cures records for 
the period March 1996 to January 2002. For 
thrusters processed at WSTF before or after the 
1995-1 997 interval, bakeout times were estimated.**** 
Results show that cumulative vacuum bakeout times 
were on average greater for active OEM fuel valves 
(3 1.4 6.2 hr, n = 104) than OEM fuel valves that 
failed due to extrusion (20.2 f 1 1.7 hr, n = 47). 
Therefore, there is little basis to link vacuum 
bakeouts performed at WSTF with extrusion. It was 
also determined that active and failed OEM fuel 
valves were returned to Marquardt and WSTF for 
thruster processing at about the same rate (Table 3). 
Therefore, there is little basis to link earlier bakeouts 
performed at Marquardt with extrusion either. 
Examination of epoxy cover coat curing records 
showed that of the seventy-nine unique PRCS valves 
or thrusters that received an epoxy cure during the 
1996 to 2002 period, 19 were fuel valves, 29 were 
oxidizer valves, and 3 1 were thrusters (fuel and 
oxidizer valves). Of the 50 (1 9+3 1) fuel valves that 
received an epoxy cure, only 2 subsequently failed 
due to extrusion (fuel valve S/Ns 714 and 642 on 
~~~ ~~ .*.. 
9.5 h at 55 +IO -5 "C (130 +20 -10 O F ) )  was assumed for 
thruster flushes; an additional 27 h at 55 +10 -5 "C (130 +20 
-10 OF)) was assumed for valve R&Rs. 
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Table 3 
Average Number of Returns to Repair Agencies 
for Thrusters with Active versus Failed (Extruded) 
Fuel Valves 
Avg. No. of Returns 
Agency Active Failed 
Marquardt 0.7 (0.8) 0.8 (0.8) 
WSTF 2.0 (0.9) 1.8 (0.7) 
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
thruster S/Ns 332 and 642, respectively). Since this 
failure rate (2 failures out of 50 epoxy cures, or 
4 percent) is much less than the overall extrusion 
failure rate from 1994 to 2003 (68 failures out of 283 
returns, or 24 percent), there is little basis to link 
epoxy cures with extrusion. 
Correlation with Oxidizer Valve Failures 
As was noted earlier, since 1981, twice as many 
(220) oxidizer valves have failed than fuel valves 
(1 10). The predominant mode of oxidizer valve 
failure has been leakage, whether manifested as actual 
oxidizer leakage during mission and ground 
turnaround at KSC, or GHe leakage during thruster 
processing at Marquardt or WSTF. Earlier studies 
have implicated oxidizer leakage as a factor in fuel 
valve pilot seal extrusion.' A higher incidence of 
concurrent oxidizer valve failure might therefore be 
expected for extrusion cases. However, a comparison 
of R&R hlstories showed a lower incidence of 
concurrent oxidizer valve failure at the time extrusion 
was detected (41 of 68 cases, or 60 percent), than 
during nonextrusion-related fuel valve failures 
detected during 1981 to 1993 (29 of 42 cases, or 
69 percent). However, this comparison was based on 
noncontemporaneous valves processed by different 
agencies, and thus may be flawed. 
Correlation with Oxidizer Valve Leakage 
The possible link between extrusion and oxidizer 
valve leakage (as measured by GHe leakage) 
occurring since 1994 was then examined (for 
contemporaneous valves processed by a single 
agency). Despite known difficulties correlating 
oxidizer leakage with GHe leakage," evaluation of 
GHe leakage data was nevertheless revealing 
(Table 4). Thrusters with active fuel valves were 
more likely to be next to oxidizer valves with no 
detectable GHe leakage (NDL) (57 percent or 
returns) than thrusters suffering from extrusion 
(1 5 percent). Active fuel valves were 
Table 4 
Gaseous Helium Leakage Rates for Oxidizer Valves 
Next to Active and Failed (Extruded) Fuel Valves 
Number None Low Medium High 
Returns scch scch scch scch 
of 0 1-99 100-350 >350 
17 64 Active 244 140 23 
(57) (9) (7) (26) 
Failed 80 12 14 15 39 
(15) (18) (19) (49) 
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are percentages; scch = standard 
cubic centimeter Der hour 
correspondingly less likely to be next to oxidizer 
valves with excessive (> 350 scch (standard cubic 
centimeters per hour)) GHe leakage (26 percent), 
compared to thrusters exhibiting extrusion (49 
percent). These observations suggest extrusion is 
linked to hgh  GHe leakage, and therefore to oxidizer 
leakage during KSC ground turnaround. 
Of the 68 extrusion cases cited in this paper, only 
2 lacked any documentation of measurable 
post-UTPA WSTF GHe leakage or KSC ground 
oxidizer leakage (fuel valve S/Ns 530 on Thruster 
325, and 543 on Thruster 237). However, subsequent 
investigation showed that fuel valve S/N 543 had 57 
desiccant tube change-outs, indicative of high 
oxidizer valve leakage, during the STS-86,8 1 ,  and 
-76 flows (1 ,3 and 5 missions before failure, 
respectively) .**** By comparison, he1 valve S/N 530 
had 7 desiccant tube change-outs during the STS-42 
flow (4 missions before failure), but no desiccant tube 
change-outs were recorded during the STS-68 flow 
(immediately before failure). 
Real time monitoring of thruster chamber 
oxidizer vapor concentrations at KSC shows that high 
concentrations (> 100 ppm) can occur despite 
indications of NDL (GHe) during the previous returns 
to WSTF." For example, of the ten highest chamber 
concentrations measured on Atlantis during the 
summer of 2003, six corresponded to oxidizer valves 
that gave no detectable GHe leakage at WSTF Depot 
during the previous return. For these reasons, lack of 
GHe data, or indications of low of NDL GHe 
leakage, or a low number of desiccant tube change 
outs, should not be taken as evidence of acceptable or 
benign levels of oxidizer leakage. 
***I 
A review of STS-42, -63, -67, -68,70, -72,72, -76, -77, -80, 
-81, -86, and -91 shuttle flow desiccant tube change out data 
revealed that on average 3.4 desiccant tube change-out are 
expected for a given thruster per Shuttle flow. 
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Figure 6 Distribution of intermittently (left) and circumferentially-welded (right) extrusion cases showing observed 
(symbols) versus expected (dashed lines) extrusion due to stress relief of the PTFE pilot seal. 
Extrusion Volume Calculations 
The calculated amount of interference fit 
(overfill) for PRCS POV pilot seals varies from 5.0 to 
8.3 percent for C- and I-welded designs, respectively 
(based on mid-range engineering tolerances). The 
primary reason for the greater overfill for I-welded 
designs was a reduction in the metal retainer id (at the 
pilot seal od interface) fiom4.15 to 4.05 mm (0.1635 
to 0.1595 in.). The corresponding metal cavity 
volumes for the C- and I-welded designs were 20.65 
and 20.29 mm’ (0.001238 and 0.001260 in.’j, which 
translates to as-fabricated overfill volumes of 1.03 
and 1.70 mm3 (6.3 . in.3 and 1.04 lo4 in.’), 
respectively. Assuming no stress relief occurs during 
fabrication (worst case), the overfill corresponds to 
the maximum possible extrusion volume that could 
occur upon stress relief in service under the condition 
of conservation of PTFE density. 
Examination of extruded pilot seals that failed in 
service gave extruded volumes as hgh  as 2.85 mm’ 
(1.74 . in.’) for I-welded seat assemblies (fuel 
valve S/N 605 on thruster 330) and 2.52 mm’ 
(1.54 . 1 O4 for C-welded seat assemblies (fuel 
valve S / N  749 on thruster 484). These volumes are 
significantly higher than the amount allowed by stress 
relief (Figure 6).  Furthermore, pilot seals involved in 
IFAs tended to have the largest od and id extrusion, 
and exceeded the maximum allowable extrusion due 
to stress relief in all 10 cases. 
Comparison of Figures 5 and 6 shows that 
premature valve failure is characterized by excessive 
extrusion above the amount allowed by 
12 
thermally-induced stress relief. I-welded pilot seat 
assemblies have a sharper edge break (max = 10 mm 
(4 mil)) on the metal retainer along the od edge of the 
pilot seal, compared to a smoother, radiused edge on 
the metal retainer for C-welded pilot seat assemblies 
(radius = 0.25 to 0.33 mm (10 to 13 mil)). The 
sharper edge break may impede seal recovery, and 
therefore accelerate extrusion. Thls contention is 
supported by the data in Figure 6. For example, the 
I-welded cases (Figure 6, left) tended to yield larger 
amounts of extrusion (2.75 * 0.97 mm’ (1.08 f 
0.38 . lo4 in.’)) than the C-welded cases (2.22 f 
0.74 mm’ (0.87 f 0.29 lo4 in.’)) (Figure 6, right), 
despite having fewer years in service (I-welds: 5.6 * 
2.7 years, C-welds: 8.2 f 2.6 years, Figure 6 data 
normalized to 1991). 
Tear-Auart Analyses 
FTIR and HPLC/IC Data 
Although thrusters receive a decontaminating 
water rinse upon receipt at WSTF Depot, and a water 
flush to remove nitrate salts during follow-on 
processing, pilot seat assemblies with extruded pilot 
seals were found to give detectable InterscanBtttt 
readings several years after valve R&R. Inspection of 
the pilot seals under magmfication (up to 1OOx) 
tttt Interscan@ is a registered tradename of Interscan Corporation, 
Chatsworth, CA. Interscans are primarily used to monitor 
hydrazine fuel vapor concentrations, and also respond to 
FORP. 




Figure 7 Representative FTIR spectra of FORP 
residues found on extruded pilot seals from 3 
different fuel valves (arrows point to characteristic 
nitrate absorbances) 
sometimes revealed the presence of brownish residues 
on the external pilot seal surfaces, or along the pilot 
seal id or od, suggesting post-process blooming or 
migration had occurred. The FTIR spectra of 
residues varied slightly, indicative of some 
compositional variation, however, all spectra were 
consistent with identification of the residue as FORP. 
One of the more notable features in the spectra were 
absorbances at 1383 (very strong) and 835 cm-' 
(medium), indicative of nitrate anion (Figure 7). 
Removal of retainers to expose the interior 
(entrapped) portions of extruded pilot seals revealed 
FORP residues inside some, but not all pilot seal 
cavities (Figure 8). Three cases with substantial 
amounts of FORP residue inside the pilot seal cavity 
(Figure 5 ,  thruster S M s  108,217, and 327) also had 
FORP present on the sealing surface or along the seal 
id or od, consistent with blooming or migration of 
FORP after valve R&R Attempts to relate the 
amount of residue found inside to cavity with 
previous oxidizedGHe leakage or the amount of 
extrusion were largely unsuccessful. For example, 
the corresponding GHe leakage rates at the most 
recent return for the three seats with the most residue 
varied widely ( S / N  108: 126 scch, S / N  217: 9324 
scch, and S/N 327: 17 scch). Also, thruster SM 330 
(2nd failure), which had little or no FORP inside the 
pilot seal cavity, exhibited the largest amount of od 
extrusion (602 microns (23.7 mil)). 
FTIR and HPLCAC analyses of residues such as 
those depicted in Figure 7 gave the first known, 
conclusive identification of nitrate anion inside a fuel 
valve pilot seal cavity. HPLCAC identified 
methylammonium nitrate (MAN) as the majority 
constituent in both internal and external fuel valve 
Figure 8 PRCS thruster SM 2 17 pilot seat assembly 
with the retainer and pilot seal removed showing a 
large quantity of FORP inside the pilot seal cavity. 
FORP residues, with little or no methylhydrazinium 
nitrate (MHN) present. The observation of 
MAN-rich FORP suggested an engine firing origin, 
since steady state burns, or pulse mode bums 
followed by a significant heating event would both 
lead to formation of more thermally stable MAN at 
the expense of the more energetic and thermally labile 
MHN. l3*I4 However, FORP composition is very 
sensitive to the fhel/oxidizer r a t i ~ . ' ~  The possibility 
therefore exists that high oxidizer vapor 
concentrations immediately downstream of the fuel 
valve pilot seal could promote formation of more 
MAN at the expense of MHN. It is also possible that 
the long intervals between last mission service and 
FORP analysis (typically >1 year) could further 
perturb MANMHN ratios. 
origin other than engine firing was obtained in 
component-level exposure testsiG simulating 
on-ground oxidizer vapor exposure and on-orbit 
thermal cycling. These tests also yielded brownish 
FORP residues (external), but in the absence of 
thruster firing. Furthermore, the FORP produced was 
MAN-rich (resulting MAN:MHN mole percent ratio 
= 83: 17, error = 0.8 percent, n=2). Finally, residues 
collected fiom pilot seat cavities of oxidizer valves 
removed fiom fleet thrusters gave no indication of 
MAN or MHN. These observations support the 
conclusion that the FORP often found in association 
with extruded pilot seals can be produced by a 
fuel-oxidizer reaction inside or close to the pilot seal 
in the absence of thruster firing. 
. 
The most compelling evidence pointing to an 
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Figure 8 DSC thermograms showing a) FORP that is intima---y associated with a fuel valve pilot seal (left), and b) 
the corresponding lack of FORI' observed in conjunction with an oxidizer valve pilot seal (right) (Ex0 Up). 
Figure 10 Heat-induced FORI'-decomposition 
resulting in discoloration of a fuel valve pilot seal 
(valve S/N 254, bottom). An identically heated 
oxidizer valve pilot seal (valve S/N 599, top) is 
shown for comparison. 
DSC Data 
DSC data on extruded fuel valve pilot seals 
(Figure 9, left) removed fiomvalve S/Ns 254,508, 
553,582,672,718,764,893, and 895, showed that 
FORP was intimately associated with bulk PTFE 
(ie., was not removed by previous decontamination, 
thruster flush, or HPLC/IC rinses. The FORP 
exotherm to PTFE endotherm peak ratio was 2.2 i 
0.8 (n=9), indicating similar amounts of FORP were 
associated with the PTFE;regardless of the amount of 
FORP observed inside the pilot seal cavity. The 
FORP composition as revealed by the presence of 
higher (MAN) and lower (MHN) temperature 
exothermic transitions attributable to FORP melting 
andor disassociation, varied from seal to seal, but 
was uniform about the circumference of a given seal. 
These exotherms were not apparent during the second 
heating, indicating the FORP had volatized or 
disassociated (giving a thermogram similar to that 
shown in Figure 9, right). Last, the foot of the pilot 
seal (farthest away from the sealing interface) did not 
show any exothermic transitions attributable to 
FORP. 
By comparison, unused Teflon 7-A pilot seal 
preforms and used oxidizer valve pilot seals only 
exhibit a PTFE melting endotherm at -330 "C (-625 
OF) (Figure 9, right). Extruded fuel valve pilot seals 
also showed a larger drop in the peak melting 
temperature between first and second heatings (AT,,, 
= 1.5 f 0.4 "C (2.7 f 0.7 OF)) than oxidizer valve pilot 
seals (ATrn = 1.1 i 0.2 "C (2.0 f 0.4 OF) or unused 
preforms (AT,,, = 0.9 i 0.1 "C (1.6 f 0.2 OF)). The 
probably can be attributed to exothermic FORI' 
volatilization and disassociation within the fuelvalve 
pilot seals. Extruded fuel valve pilot seals also were 
significantly discolored (Figure 10) after heating to 
380 "C (715 OF). The discoloration was not 
superficial, but extended deep into the pilot seal 
(Figure 9, bottom). By comparison, the unused 
preforms (not shown) and oxidizer valve pilot seals 
(Figure 10, top) retained the characteristic white, 
opaque appearance of PTFE. 
Fuel Valve S/N 544 Pilot Seal Failure Analysis 
One of the more interesting failure analyses was 
conducted on the pilot seal from thruster S/N 101 (Znd 
failure), fuel valve S/N 544 (involved in an IFA on 
STS-108). Removal of the retainer revealed little or 
no FORP inside the pilot seal cavity, despite the 
presence of an oxidizer valve with well-documented 
history of GHe and oxidizer leakage. Most surprising 
was the presence of a fracture or void along the pilot 
seal od (Figure 11). This fracture was similar to one 
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Figure 11 Fracture/void located along the outer 
diameter (at 7 o’clock) of an extruded pilot seal 
removed fromthruster SM 101, fuel valve SM 544. 
The inner (hole) diameter is 2.8 mm (0.1 1 in.). 
observed in the pilot seal from fuel valve S / N  530 
(thruster SM 325) although that fracture was located 
along the pilot seal id.’ 
Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) of the area 
immediately above the fracture region of the SM 544 
pilot seal revealed axial fissuring, suggesting tensile 
failure. SEM also revealed the presence of fine scale 
features immediately above and below the fracture, 
namely, machining grooves that had been introduced 
during latheing operations to fashion the preform 
from bar stock, suggesting the absence of 
temperatures well in excess of the 330 “C (625 OF) 
melting point for PTFE. DSC of PTFE cut from 
fracture area showed no FORP (similar to the 
thermogram shown in Figure 9, right), in contrast to 
the previous results obtained on 9 extruded pilot seals 
that did not exhibit any fracturing. 
The two leading explanations for the fracture are 
1) origination from a preexisting flaw introduced 
dnring fabrication, and 2) occurrence of a highly 
localized exothennic event involving FORP. A more 
remote explanation accounting for the lack of FORP 
could be exposure to high energy (450 keV 
accelerating potential) radiation during attempts to 
measure the amount of extrusion by X-ray Computed 
Tomography. 
Specific Gravity 
Specific gravity data on extruded pilot seals 
removed from fleet service showed that extruded 
seals had significantly lower densities than oxidizer 
valve pilot seals or unused PTFE pilot seal preforms 
(Table 5) .  Extruded pilot seal PTFE density was 
outside of the allowable 2.14 to 2.20 g cm-3 range 
stipulated for Teflon 7A by the OEM.‘6 The resulting 
de-densification would make the PTFE more 
Table 5 
Pilot Seal Densities 
Density 
Pilot Seal Type (g cm”) n 
Unexposed Preform 2.172 (0.012) 7 
Oxidizer-exposed 2.156 (0.008) 2 
Fuel-exnosed 2.102 (0.017) 5 
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
compressible than expected under conditions of 
oxidizer uptake alone, thus exacerbating lateral cold 
flow and further preventing seal recovery, and leading 
to more extrusion over shorter periods of time. 
SUMMARY 
Some extrusion is unavoidable and a natural 
consequence of using an oversized, semitrapped 
plastic seal in a thruster application which subjects 
the seal to thermal cycling. The available data 
support the conclusion that oxidizer vapor plays a 
significant contributing role in fuel valve pilot seal 
extrusion. For example, FTIR, HPLCAC, DSC, and 
component-level exposure test data all support the 
conclusion that FORP produced in the absence of 
thruster firing becomes intimately associated with the 
pilot seal and pilot seal cavity during the valve’s 
service lifetime. Oxidizer valve leakage data, specific 
gravity results, metrology data, and interference fit 
stress relief calculations all support the conclusion 
that oxidizer leakage, coupled with a partially 
effective GN2 trickle purge, causes reversible and 
irreversible modification of the PTFE, thereby 
exacerbating extrusion beyond levels expected to 
occur in response to thermally-induced stress relief. 
The available data also suggests that the retainer 
redesign has worsened the tendency of pilot seals to 
extrude. The classification of Type I versus Type I1 
extrusion was found to be somewhat arbitrary. Type 
I1 cases actually appear to constitute a less severely 
extruded subset within the Type I family, with 
distinctions between the two subsets attributable to 
differences in accumulated service. Last, thrusters 
failing on-orbit have pilot seals with more severe 
levels of extrusion than thrusters failing on-ground. 
The additional extrusion appears to originate from an 
adverse fuel-oxidizer reaction in or near the pilot seal 
occurring in the absence of thruster firing. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Towards reducing the incidence of extrusion, 
several proactive mitigation strategies have been 
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proposed. In general, these strategies involve 
modification of existing or implementation of new 
ground processes: 
Implement a more effective trickle purge, with 
minimal purge downtime. 
Monitor real-time oxidizer vapor concentrations 
within the thruster chambers during ground 
turnaround. 
Remove and replace fuel valves that already 
show signs of extrusion as revealed by current 
trace or other sensitive diagnostic test data. 
Lower the allowable GHe leakage rate for 
existing and new oxidizer valves. 
Several incremental improvements are also 
possible. For example, the use of better pilot seal 
materials-of-construction could make pilot seals less 
susceptible to 1) propellant uptake subsequent 
property modification during service, and 
2) deformation under load at temperature. Finally, it 
is generally good practice to precondition softgoods 
at the anticipated service temperatures immediately 
before final part finishing, however, this practice was 
disbanded by the OEM. At present, only the starting 
rod stock is annealed. For this reason, the 
recommendation is made to anneal as-welded pilot 
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